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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD:
HARMONIZATION OF ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR INTERNATIONAL PATENT LICENSING
AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Nhat D. Phan'
INTRODUCTION
The friction between antitrust and patent policy traces back to the
origins of the patent system in the United States.' A patent confers onto
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Washington College of Law, The American University;
B.S.E. (Chem. Eng.), 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See Paula Dwyer, The Battle over 'Intellectual Property'. BuS. WK., May 22,
1989, at 78 (reporting on the tension between the economic incentive premise of the
patent system and basic antitrust concerns); see also Lawrence G. Kastriner, The
Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. & TRADFMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5.
6 (1991) (observing that from early this century until the mid-1970s, a widespread
antitrust, antimonopoly public sentiment strongly influenced government policy toward
the patent system); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816-21 (1984) (describing the patent-antitrust conflict and
arguing that the conflict is more deeply rooted than originally thought).
Both antitrust and patent law, however, have the same economic objective.
Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-Use Restrictions as Procompetitive Elements in Patent
and Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United States and the European Com-
munities, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 364, 364 (1991). They both strive for the max-
imization of wealth by facilitating the production of goods at the lowest cost possible.
Id. The framers constructed patent law to encourage competition among inventors by
awarding a patent to the person who wins the race to discovery. 1 ERNEST B.
LIMPSCOMB Hm, LIMPscOMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:8, at 54 (3d ed. 1984). The
introduction of a new patented product on the market stimulates development for a
competing product. Id. Patent law, thereby, increases overall economic activity by
compelling both established firms seeking to remain competitive and new enterprises
attempting to enter the market to develop inventions. See SuBcoMirrm ON PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE
PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY, S. DOC. No. 22, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
4-17 (1957) (providing examples of how competition spurs economic growth). Anti-
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the patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented invention for a limited time,2 thereby granting the
patent owner a monopoly.3 The purpose of antitrust law, on the other
hand, is to prevent monopolies.4 Thomas Jefferson, the first patent ad-
trust law, on the other hand, promotes production by prohibiting monopolization.
Meyers, supra, at 364.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (providing that "[e]very patent shall contain a grant
to the patentee, his [or her] assigns, for the term of seventeen years the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the [patented] invention throughout the
United States"). The term "patentee" refers to the party or parties receiving the patent
grant as well as any successors in title. 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1988). This temporary
right of exclusivity affords patentees an opportunity to receive a fair return on their
investment of labor and capital. See ROBERT A. CHOATE ET AL., CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON PATENT LAW INCLUDING TRADE SECRETS-COPYRIGHTS-TRADEMARKS 71 (3d
ed. 1987) (justifying the reasons for granting patent privileges).
To obtain a patent, a patent applicant must submit an application containing a
written description of the invention to the Patent and Trademark Office. 35 U.S.C. §
111 (1988). The applicant must also show that the invention is new, useful, and
nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
3. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON JAPAN, CORPORATE AP-
PROACHES TO PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-JAPAN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 7 (1994) [hereinafter
CORPORATE APPROACHES TO PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT]; Blonder-
Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343-44 (1971);
contra Otto A. Stamm, GA7T Negotiations for the Protection of New Technologies,
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 680, 681 (1991) (arguing that a patent does
not confer a monopoly onto its owner because the public may solve the problem
faced by the inventor in another way). As an illustration, Dr. Stamm notes the num-
ber of pharmaceutical drugs in the market that are available for the same indication.
Id.
4. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1992) (condemning agreements
or conspiracies to restrict interstate and international trade or commerce); Department
of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584,
21,584 (1988) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines] (stating that U.S. antitrust laws represent
the legal form of the American commitment to a free market economy). See generally
Kastriner, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that courts weakened the patent system through
their decisions in antitrust cases because of their concern for restraints of competi-
tion).
Although once disfavored as temporary monopolies, patent rights in the United
States have gained high regard in recent years. See Roger B. Andewelt, Antitrust
Perspective on Intellectual Property Protection, Remarks to the American Bar Associa-
tion (July 16, 1985) reprinted in 30 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 319,
319 (1985) (describing a shift in the position of the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice toward expanding intellectual property protection); CHOATE ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 71 (commenting on the modern trend of recognizing the patent right
of exclusivity as different from the "odious monopoly" because it does not deprive
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ministrator of the United States,5 recognized this tension between the
need for an incentive to spur innovations and discoveries, and the abhor-
rence of a monopoly."
The conflict between antitrust law and patent law plays out quite
dramatically in the context of patent licensing.' A patent owner may
decline to license the right to exploit the patented invention without
legal consequence.' Antitrust liability immediately arises, however, when
the patent owner decides to license that right to others
Today, this tension plays out in another context: international patent
licensing agreements. There are various antitrust regulations dealing with
the public of any existing right to the patented invention). Patent licensing benefits
consumers by expanding access to technology in the quickest and most efficient man-
ner. DOJ Guidelines, supra, at 21,593. In effect, licensing allows the patent owner to
combine the owner's technological assets with the manufacturing and distribution
assets of others. Id.
5. P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y
237, 238 (1936).
6. See id at 239-41 (explaining that Thomas Jefferson initially detested all
forms of monopolies, but upon reflection, favored limited monopolies as a reward for
inventions); see also CHOATE ET AL, supra note 2, at 72 (arguing that the American
patent system is the only instrument that the government can use to promote inven-
tion and discovery). The patent system offers the possibility of a financial reward to
inventors and their supporters who devote time and capital to developing technology.
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent
System, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 555, 555 (1955).
7. See generally DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593 (observing that the
traditional view of intellectual property rights as monopolies created the conflict be-
tween antitrust policy and intellectual property rights and the licensing of those
rights).
A patent license is a conveyance of a right under a patent that does not
amount to an assignment. Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891). An
assignment passes title in the patent, and the right to sue infringers, to the assignee.
Id. A license, on the other hand, does not transfer title of the patent, nor confer the
right to sue infringers, onto the licensee. Id. In essence, the patent license is a con-
tract transferring to the licensee the right to make, use, or sell the licensed technolo-
gy.
8. David H. Marks, Patent Licensing and Antitrust in the United States and the
European Economic Community, 35 AM. U. L REv. 963, 966 (1986); see United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (observing that a patentee has the
power to refuse to license the patented invention).
9. Marks, supra note 8, at 966; see 35 U.S.C. § 211 (1988) (providing that a
patent holder is not exempted from civil or criminal liability under any antitrust law);
STAFF OF SUBCOM. OF THE HousE Co~M. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D
SESS., ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN THE EXPLOITATION OF PAIENTs 2 (Comm. Print
1957) (reporting on the antitrust problems that arise from the exploitation of patents).
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international patent licensing agreements in the United States, Japan, and
the European Union (EU),' with the United States promulgating the
least restrictive rules." The discrepancy in the licensing standards of
these territories creates an adverse impact on the American patent sys-
tem and, in turn, its overall economy. 2 Specifically, the difference in
licensing guidelines diminishes the value of the patent rights of U.S.
licensors and raises the cost of acquiring foreign technology for U.S.
licensees."' The negative effects on American licensors and licensees
translate into a decrease in technological innovation and economic
growth in the United States. 4
Given the present state of the U.S. economy and the impending de-
mise of its technological leadership position in the world, 5 the United
States can ill-afford to allow the current difference in patent licensing
guidelines to stand. It should take corrective measures immediately.
Part I of this Comment sets out the current antitrust laws and patent
licensing guidelines of the United States, Japan, and the EU. Part II
10. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (amending Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3).
The "European Community," formally known as the European Economic Community,
changed its name to the "European Union" following the signing and entry into force
of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in November of 1993. Id.
11. See infra notes 97-131 and accompanying text (analyzing the differences in
the patent licensing guidelines of the United States, Japan, and the EU).
12. See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text (examining the adverse effects
that liberal patent licensing guidelines have on the patent system and the economy of
the United States). Achieving comparable intellectual property protection internationally
becomes more important in view of the increase in intellectual property export from
the United States in recent years. Thomas McCarroll, Creativity-Whose Bright Idea?,
TIME, June 10, 1991, at 45. Intellectual property currently accounts for more than
25% of total U.S. exports compared to 12% just nine years ago. Id.
13. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text (detailing the adverse impact
on American licensors and licensees due to more liberal patent licensing guidelines in
the United States as compared to those in Japan and the EU).
14. See generally Clyde H. Farnsworth, In the Market Place of Ideas, Americans
Ask for Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, § 4, at 24 (examining the relation-
ship between the condition of the American economy and the level of patent protec-
tion); Oppenheim, supra note 6, at 555 (discussing the interdependence between the
patent system and private competitive enterprise in the United States).
15. See 2 REP. OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS,
GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEW REALITY 8-19 (1985) [hereinafter COMMISSION RE-
PORT ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS] (presenting persuasive evidence illustrating the
decline of the economic competitiveness of the United States in the world); Kastriner,
supra note 1, at 7 (commenting on the decline of the United States in the interna-
tional economic and technological markets).
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separates the patent licensing guidelines of these three territories into
two categories, substantive and procedural. Part II then compares the
advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches to regulating
international patent licensing agreements. Part III analyzes the impact of
a more liberal regulatory regime on the patent system and the economy
of the United States. Finally, Part IV recommends that the United States
lead an effort to harmonize the international patent licensing guidelines
of the United States, Japan, and the EU to remedy the adverse impact
that currently exists. Part IV further suggests that Japan and the EU
adopt the regulatory scheme presently in effect in the United States.
I. THE ANTITRUST LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THE EU
Antitrust laws in the United States, Japan, and the EU are remarkably
similar.' Their application to patent licensing agreements, however, has
given rise to quite divergent guidelines. The following sections describe
the antitrust laws of these territories and set forth the patent licensing
guidelines that have developed from those laws.
A. U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
Two provisions of the Sherman Act 7 are applicable to patent licens-
ing agreements in the United States: (1) section 1 forbids contracts or
conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce; 8 and (2) section 2 pro-
hibits attempts and conspiracies to monopolize trade or commerce. 9
Violators of the Sherman Act face criminal or civil prosecution2m' Pur-
16. See infra notes 17-19, 36-38, 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
antitrust laws of the United States, Japan, and Europe).
17. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1992). The literal terms of section I of the Sherman
Act prohibits all concerted activities that restrict trade. Id. Through judicial interpreta-
tion, however, section 1 applies only to unreasonable restraints of trade because al-
most all productive activity involves a cooperative effort among persons or fims that
restrict trade to some extent. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,587; contra Busi-
ness Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1988) (observing that
cooperative activity often increases productive efficiency and thereby benefits Ameri-
can consumer welfare).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1992).
20. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,585. Criminal violations of the Sherman
Act are punishable by fine of up to $10 million and imprisonment of not more than
1994]
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suant to the Sherman Act, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) promulgated antitrust guidelines for international trade ac-
tivity." These guidelines apply to international patent licensing agree-
ments.' The following subsections discuss these guidelines and de-
scribe their requirements as they relate to international patent licensing
agreements.
1. Substantive Licensing Standards
On June 8, 1988, the DOJ issued guidelines that currently apply to
international patent licensing agreements.' The guidelines focus upon
anticompetitive activity that affects U.S. consumer welfare.' The DOJ
analyzes all international licensing agreements and their restrictive provi-
sions by first determining whether the underlying transfer of technology
is a sham' or restricts competition between the parties, and bears no
relationship to the restrictions in the license." If the DOJ finds that the
license is a sham, the restrictions accompanying the license may be per
se unlawful.2
If the agreement is not a sham, the DOJ applies the rule of reason
analysis to the licensing agreement." The rule of reason analysis con-
siders licensing restrictions unlawful if they are collusive or dampen
competition, and if their anticompetitive effects outweigh their beneficial
three years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1992).
21. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,584-617.
22. Id. at 21,593.
23. Id. at 21,584-614. Although the DOJ believes that the analysis stated in the
guidelines is economically and legally correct, these guidelines are not intended to be
a restatement of the law. Id. at 21,585.
24. Id. at 21,584. The prohibited anticompetitive activities include artificially
restricting output and fixing prices. Id. at 21,586. For example, a cartel of producers
holding meetings outside the United States cannot escape antitrust liability if it impos-
es higher prices on U.S. consumers. Id. The DOJ, however, would not instigate an
antitrust enforcement action against the parties involved unless the anticompetitive ef-
fects of their activity on U.S. commerce are direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable. Id. at 21,584.
25. Id. at 21,593. A sham usually arises when the parties are demonstrably not
interested in conveying and receiving patent rights, but rather are using the license as
a pretext to restrict output, raise prices, or both, in some other market. Id. at 21,593
n.98.
26. Id. at 21,593.
27. Id. at 21,593 n.98. In addition, the offending parties may be subject to crimi-
nal prosecution by the DOJ. Id. at 21,592 n.89.
28. Id. at 21.593.
452 [VOL. 10: 1
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competitive aspects. Under this analysis, the DOJ considers the cumu-
lative effects of all restrictions in the license." If, on balance, the li-
cense has no anticompetitive effects, or if such effects are present but
do not outweigh the beneficial competitive results, then the DOJ will
not challenge the legality of the license."
29. Id
30. Id The DOJ does not normally inspect a particular restriction to determine if
the restriction advances DOJ competitive goals, or whether a less restrictive alternative
exists. Id
31. Id The DOJ Guidelines note that licensing agreements may contain, depend-
ing on the relationship between the parties, horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, or
both. Id at 21,593-594. Horizontal restraints are restrictions that affect competition
between the licensor and licensee in any relevant technological market. Id. at 21,594.
For example, a license might restrict the price and output decisions of the parties for
the technology that the parties market in competition with one another. Id. at 21,594
n.99; see Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53
ANTTrRUST LJ. 611-14 (1964) (providing examples of horizontal restraints in patent
licensing agreements). In contrast, vertical restraints are restrictions that affect competi-
tion between the licensee and other licensees who are not parties to the license, or
the licensor and other licensors. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,594.
The DOJ analyzes both horizontal and vertical restraints under the rule of rea-
son. Id at 21,593. Two principles guide the DOS's analysis: (1) antitrust laws do not
proscribe efforts by the licensor to appropriate the full inherent value of the patented
technology; and (2) the creation of competition is not a requirement for licensors. Id
Under the rule of reason analysis, the DOJ first examines the effects of the
questioned restrictions and classifies them as either horizontal or vertical. Id. The
DOJ, next, performs a separate analysis depending on the type of restriction present.
d If the questioned license contains a horizontal restraint, the DO] identifies the
technology that is an economic and competitive substitute for the technology being
licensed and the markets that are affected by the license. Id. After defining the rele-
vant technology and markets, the DOJ determines whether the elimination of competi-
tion between the licensor and licensee in that market would be anticompetitive. Id. If
this determination reveals the license as anticompetitive, it is not necessarily unlawful.
Id. The DOJ would then examine the nature and extent that the license restriction
eliminates price and output decision-making. d If these results are also
anticompetitive, the DOS would weigh the competitive benefits of the restriction
against its anticompetitive effects. Id The DOJ would challenge the license if there is
an imbalance favoring anticompetitive effects. Id
Vertical restraints, on the other hand, are accorded enormous deference. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977) (noting that
vertical restraints may promote intrabrand competition and induce investment of labor
and capital into the distribution and promotion of publicly unknown products, as well
as service and repair); DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593 (stating that such
restrictions are challenged only in rare circumstances because vertical restraints in
patent licensing agreements produce significant competitive benefits); see also Lee E.
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2. Procedural Requirements
Antitrust laws of the United States have no mandatory filing or re-
view procedure for international patent licensing agreements.32 The
DOJ, however, does allow for a "business review" of the licensing
agreement.3 Thus, if the DOJ decides to challenge a particular interna-
tional patent licensing agreement, it must do so in court.3 In order to
successfully eliminate restrictive provisions from a suspect licensing
agreement, the DOJ must prove that the agreement produces monopolis-
tic effects, unreasonable restraints on trade, or unfair competition.3"
B. JAPANESE ANTITRUST LAW
On March 31, 1947, Japan enacted the Law Relating to Prohibition of
Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy
Standards, 30 LAw & CONT7EM. PROBS. 506, 511 (1965) (identifying ways in which
vertical restrictions promote competition). The DOJ would still examine vertical re-
straints, however, by applying the rule of reason analysis to determine the
anticompetitive effects, if any. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,594. Vertical
restrictions are deemed anticompetitive only if they would facilitate collusion in the
sale or licensing of competing technologies, or exclude such technologies from the
market by tying up so much of the potential manufacturing capacity that no compet-
ing technologies could enter the market. Id. at 21,609. On the rare occasion that the
restraint raises a significant anticompetitive risk, the DOJ, before challenging the le-
gality of the license, would consider the countervailing competitive benefits to deter-
mine whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Id.
32. See Joel Davidow, The New Japanese Guidelines on Unfair Practices in
Patent and Know-How Licenses: An American View, PAT. ANITrRUST 1989, at 595,
596 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 270) (stating that while the United States has a filing and review proce-
dure for export trading and joint research ventures, it does not for patent licensing
agreements).
33. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28
C.F.R. § 50.6 (1993). The business review procedure provides licensing parties the
opportunity to discover the specific enforcement intentions of the DOJ on a particular
transaction. Id. To obtain a business review, the parties must submit a request in
writing to the DOJ Antitrust Division. Id. § 50.6.1. A copy of the agreement and all
other relevant data must accompany the request. Id. After reviewing the agreement,
the DOJ may either state its enforcement intentions, decline to act on the request, or
take another action that it considers appropriate. Id. § 50.6.8.
34. Roger D. Taylor et al., A Comparison of International Intellectual Property
Licensing Guidelines in the United States and Japan, 9 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 104,
114 (1991).
35. Id. at 109.
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Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade (the
Antimonopoly Act or the Act).36 The Antimonopoly Act is similar to
U.S. antitrust laws37 and prohibits several forms of anticompetitive ac-
tivity. 8 Section 6(1) of the Act governs international licensing agree-
ments.39 Section 6(2) requires notification of any international patent
licensing contract to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) within
thirty days of the contract's formation.' The JFTC promulgated the
Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements4 and Rules for Fil-
ing Notification of International Agreements 2 to implement these anti-
36. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansumu
Horitsu, [Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair
Trade], Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947, 2 EHS No. 2270-79, reprinted in HIOSHI
IYORI AND AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 213-65 (1983)
[hereinafter Antimonopoly Act].
37. Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 109.
38. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 36. § 1, at 214 (prohibiting activities such
as private monopolization, unreasonable restraints of trade, and unfair trade practices).
39. Id. § 6(1), at 217.
40. 1& § 6(2), at 217-18. The Antimonopoly Act established the JFTC to achieve
the Act's goals. Id. § 27(1), at 237. Some of the JFTC's most important responsibili-
ties include (1) investigating suspected violations of the Antimonopoly Act, (2) hand-
ing down decisions on such investigations through a formal hearing or recommenda-
tion procedure, (3) determining behavior constituting unfair trade practices, and (4)
recommending corrective measures to parties that have violated the Antimonopoly Act.
Id. § 2(9), at 217, § 35-(5), at 241, §§ 45-46, at 243-45, § 48, at 245. The JFTC is
also responsible for ensuring that unlawful restrictive provisions are removed from
licensing agreements. 3 STEVEN 7. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 31.0113], at 31-37 (Release #38, 1993).
The JFTC's authority to conduct hearings and make recommendations is com-
monly referred to as quasi-judicial power. The Antimonopoly Act in Foreign Trade, 1
Econ. Reg. Foreign Trade (CCH) U 37-160 (1988). The JFTC may initiate a quasi-
judicial proceeding upon notification of a violation of the Antimonopoly Act by a
private party, or when the JFTC gains evidence of a violation. Antimonopoly Act,
supra note 36, § 45(1)-(2), at 243. In a quasi-judicial proceeding, the JFTC may con-
duct a hearing, make a recommendation to the alleged violator to cease-and-desist
from unlawful conduct, or issue a consent decision. Id. § 49(2). at 246-47, § 53(3).
at 249. A consent decision requires that the 'respondent to the proceeding admit the
facts and suggest an acceptable solution. Id. § 53(3), at 249. Failing to obey a JFTC
decision may result in a fine or imprisonment. Id. § 90, at 258. The respondent,
however, may challenge the JFTC decision in a judicial proceeding by filing suit
against the JFTC in the Tokyo High Court. Id. § 77, at 256, § 86, at 258.
41. Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices With Respect to
Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements (Executive Bureau. Fair Trade Commis-
sion, Feb. 15, 1989), reprinted in Taylor et al.. supra note 34, at 142-62 [hereinafter
JFTC Guidelines].
42. Rules on Filing Notification of International Agreements or Contracts (Fair
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trust provisions. These two administrative regulations are discussed be-
low.
1. Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements
On February 15, 1989, the JFIC promulgated the current rules gov-
erning restrictions in international patent licensing agreements.43 The
JFTC Guidelines contain three lists of licensing terms. The first list,
commonly referred to as the "white list,"'  addresses licensing terms
that the JFL'C considers as acceptable trade practices.45 The second list,
the "black list,"' enumerates licensing terms that are considered as un-
fair. 7 The third list, the "gray list,"4 contains licensing terms that fall
in between the terms of the white and black lists, and "may be" con-
sidered as unfair.49
Trade Commission, as amended July 23, 1982), reprinted in Preston Moore, Antitrust
Aspects of Technology Exploitation in Japan, PAT. ANTITRUST 1989, at 629, 675-76
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 270) [hereinafter JFTC Rules on Filing Notification].
43. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, at 145.
44. Davidow, supra note 32, at 604.
45. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pmbl., J 3, at 146. The white list includes
a restriction on the licensee to less than the full life, scope, field of use, or produc-
tion level of the patented invention. See Davidow, supra note 32, at 604 (summariz-
ing guideline restrictions that are not considered unfair trade practices). The list grants
to the licensor the right to (1) require nonexclusive grantback of improvements when
each party's obligations are balanced; (2) specify use of certain components that are
crucial to the invention's quality and effectiveness; and (3) restrict export to areas
where the licensor has patents, has developed markets, or has granted an exclusive li-
cense to a third party. Id.
46. Davidow, supra note 32, at 605.
47. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pmbl., 3, at 146. The black list includes
(1) restricting sale or resale prices of patented goods in Japan, (2) requiring that the
licensee not handle competing goods, (3) restricting the use of licensed technology
even after termination of the patent agreement, (4) restricting the licensee's research
and development ability, and (5) requiring exclusive grantback of improvements.
Davidow, supra note 32, at 605.
48. Davidow, supra note 32, at 605.
49. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pmbl., 3, at 146. The JFTC will judge
situations falling in the gray list under a "rule of reason" analysis. Moore, supra note
42, at 629, 638-39. The gray list includes licensing practices such as (1) export re-
strictions in areas where the licensor is not active, (2) tying, (3) controlling export
prices, (4) requiring sales through the licensor, and (5) establishing quality require-
ments on components. Davidow, supra note 32, at 605. The JFTC usually treats these
licensing provisions as acceptable unless complaints are made, or the provisions arise
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2. Rules for Filing Notification of International Agreements
The Antimonopoly Act contains a filing requirement to ensure that
international licensing agreements do not contain illegal restrictive provi-
sions. ° As a result, Japanese licensees must file a notification"1 and a
copy of the agreement with the JFTC within thirty days of the
agreement's execution." Although the JFrC does not require the filing
of all international licensing agreements, the JFTC does require the
filing of technology-based licensing agreements, which include patent,
utility right, know-how, trademark, and copyright-related licenses.'
Failure to file the agreement results in a fine of not more than five
million yen.5" After the licensee files the agreement, the JFTC reviews
it for possible violations of licensing rules and antitrust laws. The
JFrC, however, does not provide notice to the parties when it completes
the review.Y If the JFTC does not act within ninety days, any inquiry
or challenge is unlikely to occur."
3. The Clearance System
As an alternative to the notification procedure, and in addition to
enumerating specific licensing terms that are permissible or prohibited,
the JFTC Guidelines provide a "Clearance System" which permits for-
in a dominated market context. Id,
50. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 36, § 6(2). at 217-18; Taylor et al., supra
note 34, at 122-23. The filing requirement, however, does not prevent consummation
of the licensing agreement. Moore, supra note 42, at 642. The filing requirement ap-
plies to both imports and exports of patented technology, but scrutiny is more likely
when the Japanese party is the licensee. Id. The JFTC will generally limit scrutiny to
agreements that affect the Japanese domestic economy. Id.
51. JFTC Rules on Filing Notification, supra note 42, § 2. at 675-76. The notifi-
cation is a form that sets forth certain information about the transaction. Moore, supra
note 42, at 642.
52. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 36, § 6(2), at 217-18.
53. Taylor et al., supra note 34. at 123; see JFTC Rules on Filing Notification,
supra note 42, § 2, at 675-76 (specifying the categories of international licenses in
which the notification requirement applies).
54. JFTC Regulation No. 3 of 1982, cited in Taylor et al., supra note 34. at 123
n.135.
55. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 36, § 91, at 260.
56. JFTC Rules on Filing Notification, supra note 42, § 2, at 675-76.
57. Moore, supra note 42, at 642.
58. Id
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eign licensors and Japanese licensees 9 to confirm with the JFTC that
no provision in their licensing agreement constitutes an unfair trade
practice.' The Clearance System is optional and is designed to assist
the licensing parties in constructing a lawful agreement." Before bind-
ing themselves, the licensing parties can determine the legality of spe-
cific licensing provisions in the agreement by submitting the agreement
to the JFTC under the Clearance System. 2 A JFTC clearance ensures
the licensing parties that their agreement would not be subject to a legal
challenge.63 The JFTC, however, may withdraw this clearance if the
circumstances surrounding its decision change.'
C. EU ANTITRUST LAW
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome' are the primary antitrust
provisions that govern patent licensing agreements in the EU.' Article
59. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pmbl., 5, at 146.
60. Fact Sheets about Filing System for International Agreements under the
Antimonopoly Act, § 3(1) (International Transaction Division, Executive Bureau, Fair
Trade Commission, Feb. 15, 1989), reprinted in Moore, supra note 42, at 629, 666-70
[hereinafter Fact Sheets].
61. Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 138.
62. Id. Once the JFTC determines that the agreement does not contain any un-
lawful restrictions, the JFTC will provide notification of such determination to the
requesting party. Fact Sheets, supra note 60, § 3(2), at 668.
63. Fact Sheets, supra note 60, § 3(2), at 668.
64. Id. The JF1'C Guidelines do not specify the types of circumstances that
would lead the JFTC to withdraw its clearance. Moore, supra note 42, at 638. They
might, however, include changes in the overall business relationship between the par-
ties, the concentration of market share, or other factors material to the original clear-
ance grant. Id.
The option to withdraw a prior clearance is an important JFTC power because
valid licensing agreements, which can span many years, may become invalid over
time and create unfair trade practices that necessitate a change in the JFI'C position
on the clearance. Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 120 n.121.
65. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
arts. 85-86, quoted in part in Michael L. Coleman & Dieter A. Schmitz, The EEC
Patent Licensing Regulation-Practical Guidelines, 42 Bus. LAW. 101, 101 nn.3-4
(1986).
66. See Salem M. Katsh & Douglas A. Nave, Introduction to the Licensing of
Intellectual Property Rights under the Completion Laws of the European Community:
An Outline of Primary Sources, TECHNOLOGY, LICENSING AND LrTG. 1990, at 369
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 287) (outlining the EU's antitrust provisions that are applicable to intellectual
property licensing). Articles 30 through 34 of the Treaty of Rome ensure the free
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85(1) of the Treaty prohibits agreements and concerted practices between
two or more enterprises that restrict competition within the EU.' Arti-
cle 86, although sparingly used, prohibits any enterprise or group of
enterprises from abusing a dominant position within the EU.' The fol-
movement of goods within the EU. Id. at 370. Article 36, however, justifies prohibi-
tions or restrictions on imports and exports of goods on intellectual property grounds.
Id. As a result, EU regulatory bodies have recognized the valid exercise of intellectu-
al property rights as commanded by article 36, but they have also narrowly construed
such rights when the free movement of goods is restricted. Id. at 372.
67. EEC TREATY, supra note 65, art. 85(1), at 101-02 n.3. Article 85(1) provides
as follows:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development. or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage:
or
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts.
ld.
68. Id. art. 86, at 102 n.4. Article 86 provides as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Mem-
ber States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage; or
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts.
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lowing subsections outline instances in which article 85(1) applies to a
particular licensing agreement, and the administrative remedies or ex-
emptions available.
1. The De Minimis Exception
As construed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), article 85(1)
applies only to licensing agreements that appreciably restrict competition
and affect trade between EU member-states.' The determination of
when a specific agreement appreciably restricts competition and affects
trade requires an analysis of the entire economic sphere in which the
agreement operates." The EU Commission (the Commission) interpret-
ed the ECJ's concept of appreciability in its "De Minimis Notice" (the
Notice).7 The Notice specifies the types of agreements that create only
a negligible effect on competition and, thus, do not infringe article
85(1).72
In contrast to article 85(1), article 86 does not allow for any exemptions. Id.
Discussion of article 86 in this Comment is limited for two reasons. First, article 86
is the least used general antitrust provision relating to intellectual property licensing.
Katsh & Nave, supra note 66, at 379. Second, European Court of Justice precedent
indicates a trend toward reading article 86 narrowly when patent rights are implicated.
See id. at 379-80 (citing Case 238/87, A.B. Volvo v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988
E.C.R. 18,685, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,498
(holding that refusing to license is not an abuse of a dominant position); Case 53/87,
Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per Autoveicoli (CICRA) &
SpA Maxicar v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 1990 CEC (CCH) 267 (conclud-
ing that the acquisition of exclusive intellectual property rights is not an abuse of a
dominant position); Parke Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, [1967-1970 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8054 (finding that pricing patented products
higher than non-patented products is not an abuse of a dominant position); but see
Comm'n Press Release, IP (78) 111 (June 9, 1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,055 (stating that a dismissal of patent infringement suits after defendants entered
into restrictive covenants is an abuse of a dominant position)).
69. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 101.
70. Id. at 102. The analysis is based on a number of factors which include the
nature and quantity of the licensed product, the relative positions of the parties in the
market, and the number of parties to the agreement. Id. Both the actual and potential
restrictions on competition are considered. Id.
71. Commission Notice of 3 September 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance
Which Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2 [hereinafter De Minimis Notice].
72. Id. art. 2, at 2-3. According to the Notice, article 85(1) does not apply to
agreements between firms engaged in production or distribution where (1) the products
subject to the agreement, and any substitute products produced by the parties, do not
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In the event that the de minimis exception does not apply, the exclu-
sive patent licensing agreement would violate the antitrust prohibition of
article 85(1). 7" Unless the Commission individually exempts the agree-
ment pursuant to article 85(3), the agreement is voidable by the Com-
mission, or by a court of a member-state, at any time.7! '
2. Individual Exemptions
According to article 85(3), an agreement that infringes article 85(1)
may receive an individual exemption if the agreement is generally
procompetitive.75 Only the Commission has the authority to grant ex-
emptions under article 85(3):6 Due to limited staffing and resources,
the Commission is unable to review all submitted agreements and evalu-
represent more than five percent of the total market for such products in the EU
territory affected by the agreement; and (2) the combined annual gross revenues of
the parties do not exceed 200 million European Currency Units. Id. In addition, the
Notice provides that the agreement remains outside the scope of article 85(1) even if
the parties' aggregate market share, combined annual gross revenue, or both increase
up to 10% during two consecutive fiscal years. Id. art. 2, at 3.
73. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 107. There are three possible conse-
quences for violating article 85(1). First, the infringing license becomes voidable. EEC
TREATY, supra note 65, art. 85(2), at 103 n.8. Second, the Commission may fine the
licensing parties. Id. art. 87(2)(a), at 103 n.9. Third, the licensing parties are poten-
tially liable to third-party claims for damages. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65. at
103.
74. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 103.
75. See EEC TREATY, supra note 65, art. 85(3). at 104 (providing that an indi-
vidual exemption is appropriate where the agreement meets the following four condi-
tions: (1) improves the production or distribution of goods or promotes technological
or economic progress; (2) reserves to consumers a fair share of the resulting econom-
ic benefits; (3) contains only indispensable restrictions; and (4) does not eliminate
competition in a substantial part of the product market).
76. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 103. A party who is denied an article
85(3) exemption, however, may appeal to the ECJ. id. at 104.
Typically, licensing parties seeking an article 85(3) exemption must notify the
Commission of the substance of their agreement. Council Regulation 17162: First Reg-
ulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-62 OJ. Spec. Ed. arts.
4(1), 5(1) [hereinafter Council Regulation 17/62]. Notification confers valuable privi-
leges. The licensing parties would not be subject to a fine for conduct during the
period between the agreement's notification to the Commission and the Commission's
decision, if the notification was full and accurate. Id. arts. 4, 5, 15(5). Additionally, if
an exemption under 85(3) were granted, a third party cannot later challenge the grant-
ed exemption even if that party had not been heard previously. Marks, supra note 8,
at 971-72.
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ate them for possible exemptions under article 85(3).' In response to
the large number of agreements pending review and the length of time
required for formal decisions,78 the Commission developed several pro-
cedures for disposing of agreements that are either not covered by ar-
ticle 85(1) or should receive an exemption under article 85(3)." These
alternative procedures are discussed below.
3. The Comfort Letter
The Commission may issue an administrative statement, commonly
referred to as a "comfort letter," which informs the licensing parties that
article 85(1) does not apply to their agreement, or that an exemption
under article 85(3) is available.' If the licensing parties receive a com-
fort letter, they can expect no further Commission action."'
4. The Negative Clearance
In addition to the comfort letter, patent licensing parties may seek a
"negative clearance."82 The negative clearance is a formal Commission
77. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 105; Marks, supra note 8, at 968; see
Katsh & Nave, supra note 66, at 372 (concluding that the lack of meaningful dead-
lines under article 85 contributed to the delay of exemption decisions by the Commis-
sion). Since 1962, the Commission has formally ruled on only five to 20 article 85(3)
exemption applications per year out of the 4,000 submitted agreements. Coleman &
Schmitz, supra note 65, at 105. The Commission acknowledges that although it has
issued a formal decision in as little as 10 months after receiving an agreement, com-
plex cases can require up to four years. Commission Answer to Parliamentary
Question 173/85, 1985 O.J. (C 255) 27, 28 [hereinafter Commission Answer 173/85].
The average time for formal decisions is about 24 months. Id.
78. See supra note 77 (describing the number of patent licensing agreements filed
for review each year and the amount of time required to process such agreements by
the Commission).
79. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures de-
veloped by the Commission to expedite the processing of licensing agreements that
are submitted for review).
80. See Joined Cases 253/78 and Ito 3/79, Procureur de la Republique v. Bruno
Giry & Guerlain S.A., 1980 E.C.R. 2327, 2371-74, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9H
99, 133-35 (1981) (discussing the legal status of comfort letters); see also Commis-
sion Answer 173/85, supra note 77, at 27-28 (outlining the Commission's informal
decision-making process for issuing comfort letters).
81. See Katsh & Nave, supra note 66, at 376 (stating that the Commission does
not contemplate additional administrative action on a licensing agreement that has
received a comfort letter).
82. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 76, art. 2; Katsh & Nave, supra note
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decision that the blanket prohibitions of article 85(1) do not apply.'
The clearance, therefore, implies that an exemption under article 85(3) is
unnecessary.
5. The Block Exemptions
Finally, the Commission has the authority to promulgate block exemp-
tions for certain categories of licensing agreements.' Under this author-
ity, the Commission designates types of agreements that fall within arti-
cle 85(1) because of their anticompetitive effects, but are automatically
exempted from antitrust laws under article 85(3).' One type of agree-
ment that qualifies for a block exemption is the patent licensing agree-
ment.s
The current regulation conferring a block exemption to patent licens-
ing agreements took effect on January 1, 1985." Patent licensing
agreements that satisfy the criteria of Regulation 2349 are exempted
from the antitrust rules of the EU.' Article 1 of Regulation 2349 iden-
tifies licensing provisions that fall within the scope of article 85(1), but
are exempted pursuant to article 85(3).' Article 2 lists restrictions that
66, at 376-77.
83. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 76, art. 2. The Commission grants a
negative clearance when (1) there is no legally cognizable agreement between the
parties, (2) the notified conduct does not affect trade between member-states, or (3)
the notified conduct does not appreciably restrict competition in Europe. Katsh &
Nave, supra note 66, at 376.
84. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 106 n.22.
85. Id.
86. Commission Regulation 2349184 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Ar-
ticle 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984
OJ. (L 219) 15, art. 1, at 18-19 [hereinafter Regulation 2349]; see also Commission
Regulation 1983/83, 1983 OJ. (L 173) 1 (establishing a block exemption for exclu-
sive distributorship agreements); Commission Regulation 418/85, 1985 OJ. (L 53) 5
(providing a block exemption for research and development agreements).
87. Regulation 2349, supra note 86, art. 14, at 24.
88. ld. art. 1, at 18-19. There are two important limitations on the block exemp-
tion under Regulation 2349. First, the block exemption only applies to two-party
licensing agreements. I& art. 1, at 19. Thus, parties to a three-party licensing agree-
ment must seek an individual exemption under article 85(3), instead of under the
block exemption. See supra note 75 (describing the requirements of an article 85(3)
exemption). Second, the Commission reserves the right to withdraw the block exemp-
tion when it finds that an exempted agreement has certain anticompetitive effects. See
Regulation 2349, supra note 86, art. 9(3)-(4), at 23 (describing two particular situa-
tions where the withdraw of the block exemption is appropriate).
89. Regulation 2349, supra note 86, art. 1, at 18-19. Article 1 of Regulation
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may limit competition, depending on the particular legal and economic
circumstances in which they arise.' Article 3 of Regulation 2349 ex-
2349, commonly referred to as the "white list," enumerates seven licensing provisions
that ordinarily constitute restrictions of trade within the meaning of article 85(1), but
are exempted under article 85(3). Id. Recital (11), at 16. As a prerequisite to impos-
ing the permissible restrictions upon a licensee, the licensor must obtain valid parallel
patents in the territory in which the licensee is excluded. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(3)-(6), at
19.
The white list contains two permissible restrictions upon a licensor and five
upon a licensee. Id. art. 1(1)-(7), at 19. The list restricts a licensor from exploiting
the licensed invention, or from granting licenses to others to exploit the invention, in
the licensee's territory as long as one of the licensed patents remains enforceable. Id.
art. l(l)-(2), at 19.
The permissible restrictions upon a licensee include an agreement by the licens-
ee not to make, use, or sell the licensed invention in the territories reserved for the
licensor. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(3), at 19. Similarly, a licensor may prohibit a licensee from
manufacturing or using the licensed product in the territories reserved for other li-
censees. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(4), at 19. A licensor also may require a licensee to use the
licensor's trademark provided that the licensee may identify itself as the manufacturer.
Id. arts. 1(1), 1(7), at 19.
A licensor may further restrict the licensee from an "active sales" policy in
territories licensed to other licensees. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(5), at 19. Particularly, restric-
tions on the licensee may include advertisements specifically aimed at territories li-
censed to other licensees, or the establishment of a branch or the maintenance of a
depot in such territories. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(5), at 19.
Finally, a licensor may impose a "passive sales" restriction on a licensee under
which the list requires the licensee to refuse unsolicited orders from intermediate
distributors or end-users in other EU licensees' territories for five years. Id. Recital
(12), at 16-17. The five-year period begins to run as soon as the licensor or its li-
censees introduce the product anywhere in Europe. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(6), at 19. The
five-year period for passive sales restrictions is in contrast to an active sales restric-
tion which may last for the life of the licensed patent. Id. art. 1(6), at 19.
90. Id art. 2, at 19-20. Article 2, the "gray list," identifies 11 licensing provi-
sions that are exempt from article 85(1). Id. art. 2(1), at 19-20. The exempted provi-
sions include (1) a requirement that the licensee procure goods or services from the
licensor or its designees if the products or services are required to exploit the li-
censed product in a technically-satisfactory manner; (2) a requirement that the licensee
pay a minimum royalty or produce a minimum amount of the licensed product; (3) a
restriction on the licensee's technical field of use of the licensed technology; (4) a
restriction on the licensee not to exploit the patent after the termination of the agree-
ment while the licensed patent is still in force; (5) a restriction on the licensee not to
sublease or assign the license; (6) a requirement that the licensee mark the licensed
goods with the patentee's name; (7) a requirement to maintain confidentiality regard-
ing knowledge communicated by the licensor; (8) an obligation to help stop and
prosecute infringements by informing the licensor of patent infringements, by taking
legal action against an infringer, and by assisting the licensor in any legal action
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cludes certain licensing provisions from the block exemption as
anticompetitive.9 For licensing restrictions that are not covered by arti-
cles 1 and 2, and are not prohibited by article 3, article 4 provides an
expedited procedure for notification and exemption of licenses containing
such restrictions.'
against an infringer;, (9) an obligation on the licensee to maintain a minimum quality
of the licensed product, provided that such an obligation is necessary to exploit the
licensed invention in a technically-satisfactory manner;, (10) an obligation on the par-
ties to exchange knowledge obtained through exploitation of the licensed invention
and to grant mutual licenses for improvements and new applications on a nonexclu-
sive basis; and (11) an obligation on the licensor to provide the licensee with terms
as favorable as that which the licensor later may grant to another licensee. Id. art.
2(1)-(l1), at 19-20. In addition to the eleven exempted provisions, article 2 exempts
restrictions that are more limited in scope than those listed. Id. art. 2(2), at 20.
If a licensing agreement only contains restrictions listed in articles 1 and 2, the
filing of the agreement with the Commission is not necessary to receive an exemp-
tion. ld. Recital (27), at 18.
91. Id. art. 3, at 20-21. Article 3 of Regulation 2349, the "black list," sets forth
11 licensing provisions that preclude an exemption under article 85(3), absent a spe-
cific evaluation of the overall economic facts in each particular license. Id. art. 3(1)-
(11), at 20-21. The black list contains the following prohibited patent licensing prac-
tices: (1) prohibiting the licensee from challenging the validity of licensed patents; (2)
automatically extending the license beyond the expiration of the licensed patents ini-
tially licensed; (3) restricting the parties from competing with each other in research
and development, manufacturing, use, or sales; (4) requiring the licensee to pay royal-
ties on unpatented products or for the use of knowledge that has entered the public
domain; (5) restricting the licensee's output; (6) limiting the licensee from determining
prices or discounts; (7) restricting the licensee from selecting customers; (8) obligating
the licensee to grant back to the licensor new-use or improvement patents; (9) forcing
the licensee to use other patents, products, or services which are not necessary for a
technically-satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention; (10) limiting passive
sales beyond the five years permitted under article l(l)(6); and (11) requiring either
party (a) to refuse, without good reason, to supply users or resellers within its territo-
ry who would market the goods to other members within the EU. or (b) impede
users or resellers from obtaining the goods from other resellers within the EU. Id.
The eleventh prohibition forbids licensors and licensees from preventing users
or resellers from buying or selling products that are put into the market by the paten-
tee or with the patentee's approval. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65. at 115-16.
Consequently, while the list prohibits the licensee from exporting for up to five years,
it does not restrict the licensee from selling to a "parallel importer," an intermediary
who intends to export. Id.
A patent licensing agreement may contain a restriction listed in article 3. Regu-
lation 2349, supra note 86, art. 3, at 20-21. It is unlikely, however, that such a li-
cense would receive an individual exemption under article 85(3). Marks, supra note 8,
at 968 n.53.
92. Regulation 2349, supra note 86, art. 4(1), at 21. Article 4 of Regulation
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Even though Regulation 2349 grants a blanket exemption to a group
of restrictive licensing provisions,93 the Commission has reserved the
power to withdraw the exemption in certain situations.' Article 9 out-
lines instances in which the Commission may withdraw an exemption.95
A withdrawal is appropriate where the exempted agreement has
anticompetitive effects overall and is inconsistent with article 85(3).96
II. A COMPARISON OF THE THREE APPROACHES TO
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL PATENT
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Notwithstanding the similarities in the antitrust laws of the United
States, Japan, and the EU,9 the guidelines promulgated under these
laws relating to international patent licensing agreements differ in two
significant respects. First, the guidelines in the United States employ a
rule of reason approach, while those in Japan and the EU incorporate a
per se approach.9" Second, the American regulations have no mandatory
2349 provides a notification procedure to address licensing agreements that are not
covered by articles I or 2, and do not fall within article 3. Id. These licenses may
receive an automatic exemption if the Commission does not object to them within six
months after their notification. Id. In order to obtain an article 4 exemption, the par-
ties must file full and accurate information about their agreement, and must notify the
Commission that they are filing under article 4. Id. art. 4(3), at 21.
93. Id. arts. 1-2, at 18-20.
94. Id. art. 9(l)-(5), at 22-23.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 9, at 22-23. These particular instances include (1) an arbitration
award; (2) a lack of substitutes for the licensed product; (3) the licensor does not
maintain the right to terminate the agreement if the licensee fails to exploit the li-
censed patent adequately; (4) the licensee refuses to fill unsolicited orders; and (5) the
licensee or licensor refuses to sell to users or resellers, or makes it difficult for users
or resellers to obtain the licensed product from other resellers within the EU. Id. art.
9(l)-(5), at 22-23.
97. See Marks, supra note 8, at 967 n.35 (analogizing articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome with sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); Taylor et al., supra note
34, at 114 (pointing out that the antitrust laws of the United States provided the
framework for the Antimonopoly Act of Japan).
98. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 119 (arguing that the JFTC Guidelines
have a pronounced per se quality). The "per se" approach refers to the use of black,
gray, and white lists for determining whether a particular patent licensing restriction
violates antitrust law. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of the per se approach by Japan and the EU). The black, gray, and white lists
employed in Japan and Europe evince a per se character because they determine the
legality of specific licensing restrictions without actually weighing the restrictions'
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filing or review requirement for international patent licensing agree-
ments.99 This is in direct contrast to the regulations of Japan and the
EU. The following sections elaborate on these differences and exam-
ine their respective advantages and disadvantages.
A. RULE OF REASON VERSUS PER SE ANALYSIS
1. The Rule of Reason Approach
The principal advantage of the rule of reason approach is that the
approach provides the licensing parties with a broad range of licensing
provisions from which to select.' Some licensing provisions that have
been successfully defended in the United States under the rule of reason
are specifically prohibited in Japan and Europe."
The primary disadvantage of the rule of reason approach lies in its
legal uncertainty." Licensing parties under this approach cannot accu-
rately predict the validity of their agreement under the antitrust laws."'
competitive and anticompetitive effects in the particular factual circumstance in which
the restrictions were adopted. See supra notes 44-49, 89-91 and accompanying text
(setting forth the substance of the black, white, and gray fists of Japan and the EU).
99. Davidow, supra note 32, at 599.
100. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (outlining instances in which
licensing parties must comply with a mandatory filing requirement under Japanese and
European law).
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (providing examples of licensing
terms permitted under the rule of reason analysis, but prohibited under the per se
approach of Japan and the EU).
102. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 122-24 (observing that some licensing
terns that are legal in the United States are illegal in Japan). For example, Japan and
the EU black-list exclusive grantback clauses. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pt.
1(3)(6), at 154; Regulation 2349, supra note-86, art. 3(8), at 22. On the other hand,
grantback clauses are legal in the United States. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v.
Stockes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 644 (1947). Exclusive grantback clauses are ar-
rangements whereby the licensor receives an exclusive license to any new use or
improvement patents that the licensee receives based on the originally-licensed patent.
See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrausT § 160. at 464 (1977)
(defining grantback requirements in patent licenses).
Also, Japan and the EU black-list a clause prohibiting the licensee from han-
dling competing goods. JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pt. 1(3)(3). at 153; Davidow.
supra note 32, at 605. In contrast, an exclusive dealing restriction would substantially
lessen competition and thereby violate the antitrust laws of the United States only
when a high percentage of outlets are foreclosed. Davidow, supra note 32, at 611.
103. See Marks, supra note 8, at 969 (commenting on the unpredictability of the
rule of reason).
104. See id. (stating that the unpredictability of the rule of reason adds to patentee
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This is because, under the rule of reason, a court ultimately determines
the legality of the agreement."° The ability of licensors to defend
practices that would otherwise fail under the EU's block exemption or
Japan's licensing guidelines, however, counter-balances the uncertainty of
the rule of reason approach." 6
2. The Per Se Approach
In direct contrast to the rule of reason approach, the per se approach
adopted in Japan and the EU is advantageous because it provides some
degree of legal certainty."°0 Licensing parties under the per se approach
are assured that their licensing agreement would not violate antitrust
laws if an exemption applies."' 8
The ability of the JFTC or the Commission to withdraw the exemp-
tion at anytime, however, tempers the legal certainty afforded by the per
se approach."° An exemption under the Japanese or EU licensing
guidelines is not permanent."' If the JFrC or the Commission deter-
mines that previously-exempted licensing provisions are illegal under
their antitrust laws, the JFTC or the Commission can revoke its prior
exemption and strike the offending provisions."' Accordingly, the per
se approach provides a limited degree of legal certainty to the licensing
parties.
concerns).
105. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 137 (noting that, in the United States,
challenges to the legality of a patent licensing agreement must occur in court).
106. See supra note 102 (detailing licensing terms that are illegal in Japan and
Europe, but are legal under the rule of reason analysis in the United States).
107. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 386 (concluding that the EU patent licensing
guidelines are more predictable than those of the United States).
108. See Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 116-17 (commenting favorably on
the EU's block exemption as providing certainty to the licensing drafting process).
109. Fact Sheets, supra note 60, § 3(2), at 668; see supra notes 94-96 and ac-
companying text (examining when an exemption is revocable under EU competition
law).
110. Fact Sheets, supra note 60; see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text
(examining when an exemption is revocable under EU competition law).
111. Fact Sheets, supra note 60, § 3(2), at 668; see supra notes 94-96 and ac-
companying text (examining when an exemption is revocable under EU competition
law).
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B. MANDATORY FILING REQUIREMENT VERSUS No MANDATORY
FILING REQUIREMENT
The mandatory filing requirement of the international patent licensing
guidelines in Japan and the EU further distinguishes their regulatory
schemes from that of the United States. Such a requirement conditions
the legality of a patent licensing agreement on a favorable administrative
review." The following subsections set out the different positions of
the United States, Japan, and the EU with respect to the filing require-
ment and discuss the requirement's impact on licensing parties.
1. No Mandatory Filing Requirement
The United States has no mandatory filing or review procedure, al-
though a similar voluntary procedure exists."3 The lack of a manda-
tory filing and review requirement provides the patent licensing regulato-
ry scheme of the United States with two essential benefits. First, parties
to a patent licensing agreement may proceed with little or no govern-
mental oversight after agreeing on the licensing terms."'
Second, licensing parties in the United States receive an accurate rule
of reason analysis and, thus, may structure an agreement with any provi-
sion that they believe can withstand judicial review."' If the DOJ or
another challenger to the agreement"' suspects that a licensing restric-
tion is illegal, all competitive and anticompetitive effects from the re-
striction should be apparent at the time of the challenge." 7 The DOJ
or a court, therefore, can effectively apply the rule of reason balancing
112. See supra notes 50-58, 80-96 and accompanying text (outlining the adminis-
trative review process for international patent licensing agreements in Japan and the
EU).
113. See supra note 33 (outlining the DOJ's business review procedure). The
DOJ's optional business review procedure is similar to the filing and review require-
ments of the EU and Japan in that the DOJ is merely representing its current en-
forcement intentions. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6.9 (1993). The DOJ explicitly reserves the right
to challenge the agreement in the future. Id.
114. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 124 (noting that the DOJ gets involved
in the transaction only after the parties sign and implement the agreement).
115. Id. at 114, 120-21 (observing that licensing parties may employ more re-
strictive licensing terms in the United States given that a challenge to their licensing
agreement must occur in court).
116. See id. at 114 (reporting that competitors, consumers, and state prosecutors
also have standing to challenge international licensing agreements in American courts).
117. Id. at 124.
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test and accurately determine whether a restrictive provision is
anticompetitive overall.
2. Mandatory Filing Requirements
The mandatory filing requirements in Europe differ slightly from
those in Japan. The EU notification procedure applies only to patent
licensing agreements involving more than two parties or containing pro-
visions other than those listed in articles 1 and 2 of Regulation
2349."' Patent licenses falling into one of these two categories must
undergo an individual exemption review process." 9 The process in-
volves filing the licensing agreement and all relevant information related
to the agreement with the Commission.' In contrast, the JFTC Guide-
lines require all international patent licensing agreements to be filed with
the JFTC."' While the Japanese filing requirement is more stringent
than that of the EU, both filing requirements have the same effects on
licensing parties.
A mandatory filing and review procedure is beneficial because it
prevents the licensing parties from contracting illegally." The licens-
118. See supra notes 76, 92 and accompanying text (detailing the situations in
which the Commission requires notification).
119. Regulation 2349, supra note 86, art. 4, at 21-22; see supra note 92 (examin-
ing the provisions of article 4 of Regulation 2349).
120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (specifying the documents required
under the EU's notification requirement).
121. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (describing the JFTC's filing
requirement). The Japanese notification requirement is more restrictive than the EU's
in two respects. First, the JFTC Guidelines fail to provide for a de minimis exception.
Cf. De Minimis Notice, supra note 71, art. 2, at 2-3 (setting forth the EU's de mini-
mis exception). Second, the JFTC Guidelines do not waive the notification requirement
for licensing agreements that only contain white or gray list restrictions. Compare
Antimonopoly Act, supra note 36, § 6(2), at 218-19 (requiring the filing of all inter-
national patent licensing agreements with the JFTC) with Regulation 2349, supra note
86, Recital (27), at 18 (providing that the Commission excuses licensing agreements
that only contain restrictions listed in articles 1 and 2 of Regulation 2349 from the
notification requirement). The JFTC's more restrictive filing and review requirement
tends to exacerbate the effects of the requirement, causing longer delays and more
renegotiation of licensing terms. Infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 56, 80-83, 92 and accompanying text (reporting that patent-
ing licensing agreements in Japan and Europe are pre-screened for antitrust violations
before the agreements becomes effective); see also Taylor et al., supra note 34, at
121 (opining that the Japanese Clearance System affords the licensing parties an op-
portunity to determine the legality of their agreement before committing to it).
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ing parties, therefore, save the potential litigation costs of defending an
antitrust enforcement action or a claim of antitrust violation by a private
party.123
A mandatory filing and review requirement, however, has three major
drawbacks." First, the requirement interjects bureaucratic delays into
the licensing process. In Japan and the EU, licensing parties undergoing
a filing and review procedure must wait anywhere from three months to
several years before their agreement is cleared of antitrust violations."
Second, the licensing parties risk renegotiation of the offending provi-
sions of their agreement in light of the objections made by the JFTC or
the Commission."
Third, the mandatory notification requirement renders inaccurate re-
suits under the rule of reason analysis. The JFTC applies the rule of
reason to gray list clauses,"2' while the Commission uses the test in
determining whether to grant an individual exemption. The JFTC
and the Commission, however, are hard pressed to effectively conduct
the rule of reason balancing test. Both the JFTC and the Commission
are under time constraints to conduct the test and render a decision."
These time constraints limit their ability to identify latent beneficial
123. See supra notes 40, 73 (discussing the potential criminal and civil liability of
violating antitrust laws in Japan and the EU); see also Marks, supra note 8, at 967
(detailing the risk of an antitrust counterclaim whenever patent owners instigate en-
forcement of their rights).
124. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (outlining the three principal
drawbacks of a mandatory filing requirement for patent licensing agreements). In
addition to the three major disadvantages of a notification requirement discussed in
the text, one cannot overlook the time and effort involved in completing the notifica-
tion application and collecting supporting information. See Coleman & Schmitz, supra
note 65, at 110-11 (noting the disadvantages of EU's article 4 notification procedure).
125. See supra notes 56-58, 77-78 and accompanying text (commenting on the
lengthy waiting periods in Japan and the EU for patent licensing approval).
126. See Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 117 (noting that the licensing
parties may amend their agreement in response to a Commission objection); Taylor et
al., supra note 34, at 118-19 (outlining the process that the licensing parties must un-
dergo in order to bring their agreement into compliance after a rejection by the
JFrC).
127. See JFTC Guidelines, supra note 41, pmbl., 
€ 3, at 146 (stating that the
legality of "may be" violations is determined after a consideration of the relative
positions of the licensor and licensee in the relevant market, the current status of that
market, the duration of restrictions imposed, and other relevant factors).
128. See EEC TREATY, supra note 65, art. 85(2), at 103 (defining the circum-
stances in which an individual exemption is justified under EU antitrust law).
129. Supra note 125.
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competitive or harmful anticompetitive effects of a particular licensing
provision."3 Moreover, the licensing agreement must operate for some
time before evidence of these effects becomes apparent.' Consequent-
ly, the JFTC and the Commission cannot conduct a rule of reason bal-
ance effectively.
Ill. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERING PATENT
LICENSING GUIDELINES IN THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, AND THE EU
As discussed above, antitrust regulations of international patent licens-
ing agreements in the United States differ from those in the EU and
Japan in two aspects. First, the substantive licensing guidelines of the
United States are more liberal. Second, the United States has no manda-
tory filing requirement. The differences in these regulatory schemes
create a detrimental impact on the patent system and the economic com-
petitiveness of the United States. The next two sections examine the
negative impact caused by the differing patent licensing regulations in
the United States, Japan, and Europe.
A. THE EFFECTS OF LIBERAL PATENT LICENSING GUIDELINES
The use of the rule of reason approach in the United States for all
licensing provisions, as compared to the black, white, and gray lists
employed in the EU and Japan, implies that restrictive licensing terms
are more likely to exist in licensing agreements in the United States
than in Europe and Japan.' This difference places American licensors
and licensees at a comparative disadvantage in relation to their foreign
counterparts in Japan and the EU.
While foreign licensors may negotiate for a broad range of restrictive
licensing terms in the United States,'33 Japan and the EU limit Ameri-
can licensors to restrictions enumerated in the white and, possibly, gray
lists."M This disparity creates an adverse effect on the dynamics of the
130. Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 123.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (providing examples of licensing
terms permitted under the rule of reason analysis, but prohibited under the per se
approach of Japan and the EU).
133. Supra note 132.
134. See supra notes 45, 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive li-
censing terms that are permissible under Japanese and European antitrust law).
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U.S. patent system." Restricting U.S. licensors to certain licensing
provisions reduces the economic value of their intellectual property
rights.35 Because the grant of intellectual property rights provides the
economic incentive for investment into research and development,13
the decrease in market value of these rights would lead to a reduction in
innovation and discovery in the United States.m
U.S. licensees, on the other hand, face the opposite pr9blem. They are
the recipients of the more restrictive licensing clauses that foreign
licensors legally impose. 39 The ability of foreign licensors to impose
more restrictive licensing provisions raises the cost of acquiring patented
technology from abroad." This translates into less inbound patented
technology transfer. 4' As a consequence, the technology transferred
135. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (examining how more liberal
patent licensing guidelines in the United States adversely affect the balance between
reward and innovation).
136. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593 (noting that permitting the pat-
ent owner to fully exploit the intellectual property would increase the perceived value
of the property); Wilbur L. Fulgate, Antitrust Aspects of International Patent and
Technology Licensing, 5 J.L. & COM. 433, 438-39 (1985) (commenting that patent
owners should not be prevented from earning the maximum reward by licensing their
right to exclude in the most efficient manner possible); RICHARD A. PoSNR ANTIn-
TRUST. CASES, ECONOmiC NoTEs, AND OTHER MATERiALS 287 (1974) (arguing that
forbidding patentees from setting minimum-price restrictions in licenses might discour-
age licensing, thereby reducing the patent reward and productive efficiency). See gen-
erally Staum, supra note 3. at 682 (noting that investments made in research and
development in one country are recoverable through international sales of the patented
technology). The DOJ Guidelines further note that certain restraints in patent licenses,
such as exclusive use, encourage efficient development and use of the licensed tech-
nology. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593.
137. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593 (observing that intellectual prop-
erty rights provide the incentive for innovative effort).
138. See id. (suggesting that the patent owner should benefit from the full value
of the patent in order to perpetuate innovative effort); see also Stamm, supra note 3.
at 681 (opining that clearly defined intellectual property rights promote investment and
innovation).
139. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (reporting on licensing restrictions
that are legal in the United States such as exclusive grantback clauses and exclusive
dealings requirements, but are black-listed in Japan and Europe).
140. See generally Stammr, supra note 3. at 682 (noting that investment costs
made in one country are recoverable through international sales of the patented tech-
nology); Fulgate, supra note 136, at 439-40 (commenting on the relationship between
the value of the patent right to exclude, and the ability to license that right, in the
most efficient manner possible).
141. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,593 (stating that "licensing of intel-
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from other nations will cost more to U.S. consumers.""
B. THE EFFECTS OF A MANDATORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
The bureaucratic delays caused by ther mandatory notification require-
ments of the JFrC and the Commission effectively reduce the patent
term of U.S. licensors.'43 The waiting period between the notification
of the agreement and its approval shortens the amount of time in which
U.S. licensors may exploit their patent rights in Japan and the EU.'"
A shortened patent term decreases the economic value of the exclusive
rights of U.S. licensors, 45 and thereby diminishes the incentive to re-
search and develop new technology."
Moreover, the regulatory delays in the licensing approval processes of
Japan and the EU create time lags in other vital areas. 47 For instance,
licensed technology often gives rise to additional innovations and dis-
coveries.' Thus, delaying the transfer of the licensed technology
would produce a concomitant delay in the innovations and discoveries
lectual property benefits consumers by expanding access to technology and bringing it
to the market place in the quickest and most efficient manner").
142. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (asserting that liberal licensing
standards in the United States permit foreign licensors to impose more restrictive
licensing terms on U.S. licensees, thereby raising the cost of purchasing patented
technology originating from overseas). The increased costs borne by U.S. licensees are
inevitably passed onto retail purchasers in the U.S. market. See Stamm, supra note 3,
at 681-82 (discussing the connection between patented technology and consumers).
143. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (expanding on how a lengthy
patent licensing approval process cuts into the limited time in which a patent owner
has to exploit the invention).
144. See Michael W. Thomas, Inbound Transfers of Japanese Technology Rights:
Some Practical Considerations, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357,
363 (1991) (enunciating that the patent term in Japan extends for 15 years from the
date of publication, but no more than 20 years from the filing date of the patent
application). Thus, any delay between this date and the date the licensing contract
takes effect reduces the length of time in which the patent is enforceable.
145. See generally Fulgate, supra note 136, at 439-40, 443 (emphasizing the rela-
tionship between the value of patent rights and the extent to which they are exploit-
able most efficiently).
146. See Oppenheim, supra note 6, at 555 (observing a direct relationship between
the value of patent rights and the degree of innovation).
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (asserting that bureaucratic
delays due to a mandatory filing requirement slow the rate of innovation and adverse-
ly impact consumer welfare).
148. See SULLIVAN, supra note 102, § 160, at 464 (stating that licensed technolo-
gies give rise to subsequent improvement patents by the licensee).
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based on that technology.'49 In addition, a lengthy approval process
would slow the rate at which newly patented products would enter the
market.1 o
Hence, the overall impact of maintaining a more liberal and laissez-
faire antitrust regulatory regime with respect to international patent li-
censing agreements in the United States is three-fold: (1) fewer innova-
tions and discoveries; (2) decreased international technology transfers;
and (3) reduced economic activity.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the adverse impact that differing patent licensing guide-
lines in the United States, Japan, and the EU have on Americans, the
United States has compelling reasons to lead an effort to harmonize the
patent licensing guidelines of the three territories. The remaining sec-
tions of this Comment focus on how the United States should proceed
in harmonizing its antitrust guidelines for international patent licensing
agreements with those of Japan and the EU, and what the uniform
guidelines should contain.
A. ACHIEVING HARMONIZATION OF PATENT LICENSING GUIDELINES
IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THE EU
To harmonize the antitrust guidelines for international patent licensing
agreements, the United States must exercise one of its two bargaining
chips, if not both. First, the United States should condition the resump-
tion of the global patent harmonization talks' on the Japanese and
149. See generally id. (discussing the relationship between the licensed technology
and improvement patents that are based on that technology).
150. See Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 111 (insisting that a notification
requirement delays the formation of the licensing agreement).
151. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, US Says "Not Now" To Resumption of Patent
Harmonization Talks, NEvs, Jan. 24, 1994 (announcing that "the United States would
not seek to resume negotiations of a treaty harmonizing the world's patent laws");
Observations of the International Bureau Following the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference, U.N. VIPO, Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Sup-
plementing the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned, U.N. Doc.
PLTIDC/69 (1993) (providing the proposed text of the Patent Law Treaty). The World
Intellectual Property Organization initiated the effort to harmonize substantive patent
laws of the world in 1985. Request for Comments on Patent Lmv Harmonization,
1153 OFF. GAZ. PAT. & TRAD.IuARK OFF. 113, 113 (1993). This effort began with a
series of meetings of patent experts and culminated in the Treaty Supplementing the
Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned. Id
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European adoption of uniform antitrust guidelines for international patent
licensing contracts.' Because of the close relationship between patent
and antitrust law,' linking the willingness of the United States to re-
sume the negotiations for substantive patent law harmonization with the
Japanese and European adoption of such guidelines would be sound
policy.
Second, the United States should compel Japan and the EU to adopt
uniform antitrust guidelines by threatening to close the American market
to their technology."s The imposition of trade sanctions is a drastic
Aside from the treaty's development under the auspices of WIPO, the patent
offices of Japan, Europe, and the United States are currently in trilateral negotiations
to achieve uniform patenting standards and procedures. William S. Thompson, Equita-
ble Defenses in a Harmonized Patent System, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
757, 758 (1993). These negotiations offer an ideal forum for the United States to
propose the harmonization of national antitrust guidelines for international patent li-
censing agreements with Japan and the EU for two reasons. First, the necessary par-
ties are already assembled. Second, this topic fits into the general theme of the trilat-
eral discussion, which is the harmonization of patenting standards and practices in the
United States, Japan, and the EU. Id.
In a separate forum, the United States pressured other foreign countries into
strengthening their national intellectual property laws in an effort to provide greater
protection of American intellectual property in foreign countries at the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) conference. Report Outlines
President's Agenda and Review of U.S. Trade Policy, Bus. AM., Mar. 26, 1990, at 8-
10. The Uruguay Round produced the first-ever agreement on intellectual property
rights in a trade-related context (TRIPS). See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, GATT Dec.
MTN/FA II-AIC (Dec. 15, 1993) (setting forth the provisions of the agreement).
Curiously, article 40 of TRIPS authorizes member-states to regulate particular licensing
practices through national legislation, but does not attempt to establish substantive
standards. Id. art. 40. This is in direct contrast to the other provisions of TRIPS,
which set forth minimum standards for intellectual property rights. E.g., id. arts. 9-21,
27-39.
152. See CORPORATE APPROACHES TO PROTECING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 3 (opining that if the United States makes changes to its pat-
ent system in order to promote global harmonization, it should receive something
significant in return).
153. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (elaborating on the interplay be-
tween antitrust and patent policy).
154. See McCarroll, supra note 12, at 44 (commenting on the pressure exerted by
the United States on foreign governments through threats of trade barriers in order to
curb piracy of American intellectual property abroad); see also Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-176
(1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq. (Supp. 1992)) (stating that
the U.S. Government, for example, could impose trade sanctions against countries that
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measure. But, it is justified because the stakes are high. At risk is the
international economic and technological competitiveness of the United
States." In addition, the current difference in patent licensing guide-
lines among the trading partners threatens the interests of U.S. licensors
and licensees, and the stability of the U.S. patent system.
A major drawback to harmonization of the guidelines for Japan and
the EU is that each would lose some autonomy. Japan and the EU have
employed antitrust law as a vehicle to achieve policy objectives other
than competition.1" Japan framed its licensing guidelines to equalize
the bargaining positions of what it saw as weak domestic licensees and
domineering foreign licensors." The EU, on the other hand, structured
its patent licensing block exemption with the goal of market integra-
tion. 59 Japan and the EU, however, should refrain from using antitrust
law as a means of imposing fairness or achieving market integration,
respectively, because these policy objectives are ancillary and remote to
the purpose of antitrust law, which is to ensure competition in the mar-
ket place."W
do not provide adequate protection for, or deny fair market access to, U.S. intellectual
property under the "Special 301" provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended in
1988); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Combating Piracy of Intellectual Property in Interna-
tional Markets: A Proposed Modification of the Special 301 Action, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1991) (providing a thorough discussion of the background and
operation of the "Special 301").
155. See COMisSSION REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL COMiPETnITNE, supra note 15, at
8-19 (presenting persuasive evidence that the economic competitiveness of the United
States in the world has declined); see also Kastriner, supra note 1, at 7 (commenting
on the decline of the United States in the international economic and technological
markets).
156. See supra notes 132-50 and accompanying text (describing the adverse effects
of the current discrepancy among the patent licensing regulations of the United States,
Japan, and the EU on American interests).
157. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (articulating the ulterior goals
incorporated into the patent licensing guidelines in Japan and Europe).
158. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 122-40 (delineating the protectionist ef-
fects of the 1968 JFTC Guidelines). Realistically, Japan no longer needs to protect its
licensees. See Thomas, supra note 144, at 357 (announcing that Japan is rapidly be-
coming a technology exporter instead of an importer as evidenced by its research and
development efforts).
159. See Fulgate, supra note 136, at 444 (observing that the Commission has
adopted a strict view of intellectual property rights where the exercise of those rights
affect competition in Europe); Marks, supra note 8, at 992 (concluding that the differ-
ence between the licensing guidelines of the United States and the EU stem from the
EU's goal of market integration).
160.-See Meyers, supra note 1, at 364 (asserting that antitrust law is a vehicle to
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B. THE UNIFORM PATENT LICENSING GUIDELINES
Once Japan and the EU become receptive to the notion of uniform
antitrust guidelines concerning international patent licensing agreements,
the United States should propose that they adopt its system of regula-
tion. The rule of reason approach, with no mandatory notification re-
quirement, is superior to the per se approach with a mandatory review
procedure for two principal reasons. First, the lack of a mandatory noti-
fication or prior approval procedure would eliminate the detrimental
effects of a bureaucratic delay.' More importantly, the value of a
mandatory filing requirement is negligible because a clearance from the
JFTC or Commission does not prevent an enforcement proceeding at
some point in the future.'%
Second, the rule of reason approach draws the proper balance between
the competing policies of antitrust law and patent law. This approach
satisfies patent policy because patent owners could obtain the full eco-
nomic value of their patent rights by legally demanding more restrictive
licensing terms. The rule of reason approach also achieves antitrust
objectives by limiting restrictive licensing terms to those that do not
unreasonably restrict competition. 63
As for the deficiencies of the rule of reason approach, the legal un-
certainty and corresponding litigation costs that inherently engender this
approach" should not be major concerns. Court precedent should pro-
vide sufficient guidance for drafters to feel confident about the legality
of their licenses. 65 Furthermore, savings from not adhering to a notifi-
achieve wealth maximization and expansion). Moreover, the EU should favor more
liberal patent licensing guidelines. Id. Because licensors/patentees have the right not to
exploit their inventions, liberalizing the guidelines would provide more economic in-
centive for licensors/patentees to make, use, or sell their inventions. Id. Liberalization
of its patent licensing guidelines would thereby increase the movement of goods
among member-states of the EU. Id.
161. See supra notes 125, 143-46 and accompanying text (noting that the filing
requirements in Japan and the EU cause delays from three months to several years).
162. See supra notes 64, 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility
of an exemption withdrawal by the JFTC or Commission).
163. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (defining the elements of the
rule of reason approach).
164. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (analyzing the disadvantages
of the rule of reason approach).
165. See Taylor et al., supra note 34, at 120-21 (noting that courts would make
the ultimate decision on the legality of any patent licensing agreement under the rule
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cation requirement should offset potential litigation costs.'"
Accordingly, harmonizing the international patent licensing guidelines
of the EU and Japan with those of the United States would eliminate
the current bias against American licensors and licensees.'6 Harmoni-
zation would also promote international exchange of new technology,
deliver the latest innovations to consumers, and create stronger econo-
mies."
CONCLUSION
The differences between the antitrust guidelines for international pat-
ent licensing agreements in the United States and those in Japan and
Europe significantly affect the patent system, the transfer of technology,
and the economy in this country. These differences tend to reduce inno-
vations and discoveries, technology exports, and overall economic ac-
tivity. Thus, the current situation demands that the United States lead an
effort to harmonize the international patent licensing guidelines of the
United States, Japan, and the EU. The resulting uniform patent licensing
guidelines should employ the rule of reason approach for all licensing
terms and should not include a mandatory notification requirement.
of reason approach as implemented in the United States).
166. Compare Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 65, at 110 (articulating the costs
associated with a mandatory filing requirement) with Marks, supra note 8. at 992
(considering the potential litigation costs of enforcing a patent license).
167. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text (assessing the current bias
against American licensors and licensees resulting from substantive and procedural
differences in the patent licensing guidelines of the United States, Japan, and the EU).
168. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (explaining the inter-relation-
ship among international patent licensing guidelines in the United States. Japan, and
the EU, the extent of innovation, and the state of the overall economy).
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